Several recent studies in a variety of social science disciplines have pointed to the connection between domestic American politics and the World Bank, a connection which seems to be particularly strong given the relationships among leadership of the Bank and the American political class. 1 prevents an open, public debate among potential candidates for the presidency of the Bank, thus preventing the Bank's stakeholders from determining whom they might endorse. Similarly, the process impedes a fair airing of the relevant qualifications a candidate brings to the position and ensures that the Bank's president will not come from a developing country. Some would simply end the practice insofar as it appears to give the US an inordinate hold on the organization.
Others would do so, based on the argument that there is nothing more fundamental to a constitutional system than the techniques an organization adopts and employs for the selection of its decision makers, particularly executive officials. The IMF/World Bank deal strikes at the heart of how international decisions are made, the public values of international organization, and the private control of particular institutions. 2 Each strain of these arguments was alive and well during the most recent selection of Dr. Jim Yong Kim in 2012 by President Barack Obama.
This paper explores the link between domestic American politics and the World Bank by considering how the US's selection of the World Bank's president has shaped development policy across the history of the World Bank. I find that American politics, filtered through the representation of the US at both the head of the organization and on the executive board, have resulted in outcomes that both pulled development policy closer to US national interests at some times, and pushed the Bank into a more independent role at other times. 3 The outcomes veer towards institutional autonomy when the president of the Bank was appointed by one presidential administration and his term carried over to the next US presidential administration with a different political party. The variation occurs because when a new administration comes to Washington, it must be organized and find its way through the maze of agencies and 3 international organizations that need to be staffed. This creates institutional "space" and opportunities for the World Bank president to assert a more independent role vis a vis the American government. In short, World Bank presidents do not seek the same goals as American presidential administrations once they move outside of the domestic sphere and into the international one, and particularly after the distinct appointment tie is broken.
The insight that emerges from a comparison of these four cases with respect to the independence of the Bank from its largest shareholder, and with respect to domestic politics in the US, is that the American presidents have no doubt influenced the trajectory of the organization and thus global notions of development. Nonetheless, the circumstances accompanying weighted voting and thus the Bank's US executive director (ED) controlling the largest bloc of votes under American management have resulted in outcomes that are not easily categorized outside of their historical context.
To explore the meaning of the US-World Bank relationship as it relates to the selection of the president, this paper evaluates the influence of US politics through the prism of the selection and networks of four World Bank presidents on the thinking and practice of development policy in the World Bank during their tenure: Eugene Meyer, Eugene Black, Robert McNamara, and James Wolfensohn. The use of the historical narrative provides a good method to investigate this topic, and archival materials in particular, because they allow the researcher to examine different points of view from different documentary sources. These four cases are significant because the early clash between the Bank's first president, Eugene Meyer, and first US Executive Director (ED), Emilio Collado, combined with the desire of the US foreign policy establishment to tap New York capital markets to result in a weaker board than the Bank's Articles of Agreement might suggest. Nonetheless, the Bank's transformation from a bank to a development agency can be associated with the desire of two of these presidents, Robert McNamara and James
Wolfensohn, to seek a high degree of independence from the US government. These later presidents reinforced this institutional autonomy by creating and strengthening the Bank's internal research capabilities. The paper's approach is limited, however, in what light it sheds on views of development policy in other parts of the world during these years. However, many such explorations have been conducted elsewhere. 4 To demonstrate this feature of the US-World Bank relationship, the paper begins with an introductory section on the connection between the selection of the World Bank's president and Fund (IMF). The informal method of selecting these leaders has been challenged over the history of both organizations by many stakeholders, but in recent years it has come to represent how the international system operates at its most essential level, that is, how resources are allocated, and how international law will be interpreted. In this regard, the US and industrialized countries exert disproportionate influence overall. 5 For this reason and others related to weighted voting mechanisms within them, the IMF and World Bank have been perceived as operating within the framework of a US postwar hegemonic, liberal regime, underpinned with norms advocating market-oriented modes of allocation as a particular approach to development.
Conversely, the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, particularly the United Nations First of all, studies of the American presidency point to the institutional weakness of the person who holds the office. He is generally depicted as one individual among many in a set of institutions who holds little direct power. 8 Among the most prominent scholars of the topic, Richard Neustadt characterizes power as "personal influence of an effective sort on governmental action." 9 He views the presidency as a weak role because there is a large gap between what is expected of the individual and their assured capacity to carry through on it. As expectations rise during a president's term, support from any constituency falls, and foreign alliances weaken. Neustadt echoes Harry Truman in arguing that within the American system of shared powers, presidential power is chiefly the power to persuade. While the power to command can be a method of persuasion, it is neither a substitute for it, nor a method that can be used frequently. 10 Therefore, when the president makes an appointment to a given position, he or she appoints an individual who then heads a large, complex organization. That person must likewise try to obtain influence amid the many other roles required, chiefly "chief administrator"
and "chief of global development strategy." As a result, the power of the US presidential administration and government agencies is one step removed from the organization. 18 Rather, I use the cases to explore the connection so that its results may be applied to, and evaluated within, the current historical context. Other World Bank presidents are more transitional figures whose vision of development is harder to characterize. Hence, a more detailed study would be necessary to build a more comprehensive understanding of the connection.
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The First President of the World Bank: Eugene Meyer
Although Partisan politics in the US were less of a concern at the time than the internal tension between the World Bank's president and its board. The American political system of the 1940s and 1950s has been characterized by weak political parties and little cohesion in Congress.
Rather, committee chairs, who were elected to Congress by their own efforts and responsive to 9 their districts, owed little to either the national political party or president. Hence, the US president could not count on the support of his party in the Congress on matters of foreign policy or otherwise. 22 Meyer's Republican affiliation mattered less at the time to the Truman administration than his wide range of previous experiences in the banking sector and government service. In fact, according to Kraske's evaluation of his service, his reputation on Wall Street was one of his strongest assets. He stated his intention to operate the Bank on sound banking principles explicitly. 23 Meyer's intention led him to clash with Emilio Collado, the American ED. Whereas Under these circumstances, and without the trust of Wall Street, Meyer was not able to sell bonds or issue loans. In addition to his clashes with Collado, he was frustrated with disputes among member nations.
Eugene Meyer resigned, suddenly, in December of 1946. His departure was thought to have sealed the fate of the young organization in a setback from which it could never recover. 25 It was difficult to find a replacement for him. Several bankers, including Graham F. Towers, governor of the Bank of Canada, were approached. Towers declined because he argued that a US citizen had to lead it in order to restore its credibility on Wall Street. 26 proper loan conditions. 27 Thus, despite Meyer's short tenure, substantive differences of outlook between the World Bank president and US ED were eliminated, and the selection of the president was solidified as a channel of American influence with the weaker board in place.
Given the short time he held the position, however, Meyer's influence on the institution's notion of development was limited. His background in banking lent him a technocratic, economic vision that stressed access to credit. Drawing on his experiences with the Famine Emergency Committee in an address to the Academy of Political Science, he stated that the Bank's intention was not to compete with private banks, but to fulfill the mission established at Bretton Woods to promote exchange after the war. In his view, private investors would not make foreign loans without some reasonable assurance that borrowers are approaching a balanced economic position. In the interim, the Bank could achieve what private banks would not be in a position to. 28 For their part, developing countries did not perceive themselves to be countries with general "development" problems at Bretton Woods. Rather, they saw themselves as new, raw-material producing nations. 29 
A Transformational President: Eugene Black
Notions of development as an entirely new strategy for dealing with the perceived problems of large countries that came to be referred to as "underdeveloped" took shape between 1945 and 1955. 30 The IBRD organized the first economic mission of its kind sent to a country, Colombia, with the purpose of formulating a comprehensive strategy for the country in November of 1949. 31 The approach was new because it offered an integrated manner of intervention in all social and economic matters of importance. 32 At the same time the World Bank embarked on its initial forays into the new comprehensive development initiatives in 1949, Eugene Black assumed the presidency. Since the concept of development was being built in those years, Black held a view of the topic that was inherently centered on diplomatic and strategic alliances for the United States, as opposed to a true vision for the future development of poor countries that would emerge in later years.
Black was initially appointed as president of the World Bank by the Truman administration, but worked well with the Republican Eisenhower administration that followed.
Thus, Eisenhower recommended his appointment to second and third five-year terms. 33 Unlike the first president, Meyer, or the second, John McCloy, Black brought a high level of experience to the position because he had served as the American ED prior to his appointment as president.
Like the two previous presidents, he also brought experience from Wall Street where he had worked at the Chase National Bank. Black's initial priority when he had been ED was for countries to re-establish their credit. Nonetheless, the Bank itself also had no credit when Black arrived, and it had to prove that it was going to make sound loans in order to raise capital.
Moreover, legislation was required in each of the fifty states to make the Bank's bonds legal investments for insurance companies or savings banks or pension funds or fiduciary funds.
Therefore his initial efforts were directed at seeing to it that the necessary legislation was passed. 34 In addition, the Bank needed legislation in Congress making IBRD bonds "exempt security," or a security that commercial banks can deal in, such as government bonds or municipal bonds. 35 Once the requisite legislation was passed, the Bank needed to convince investors to buy the bonds. Black and others made speeches and invited groups to come to Washington for "information conferences" where investors would meet with Bank officials and discussed how it planned to operate. 36 At the end of his term as ED and prior to his time as president, he returned to the Chase Bank. 40 He continued the process of introducing the Bank to international financial markets and navigating the political terrain that was required to ensure passage of critical legislation during his tenure as president.
As the world recovered from the war, notions of development lending began to take shape. Whereas the Bank's early loans for reconstruction in Europe were the program type, its early loans to developing countries had a project focus. 41 When developing member countries did request assistance, they raised questions of the creditworthiness of the borrowers rather than broader questions of global inequality. Black reflected the thinking of his day that viewed the lack of development as a problem of lack of modernization, or simply in technological terms. He followed the thinking of the Bank's economists as it evolved in its understanding of development, but did not allow economists a major role in running the organization. This led to tension within the organization. 43 Therefore development emerged as a mode of thinking and source of practices within a mode of thinking and source of practices that became an omnipresent reality. 44 As this process evolved, development became more professionalized and was grounded in a network of development institutions responsible for putting plans into action. McNamara's endorsement of Bobby Kennedy's candidacy for president further lent the impression that he was not acting as the head of a multilateral body, but as an actor within the US domestic arena. Nonetheless, the previous Bank president, George Woods, and McNamara knew each other before McNamara's appointment. Woods thought he might be a good choice.
Whereas Woods had overseen the growth of the bank as a development institution, it had occurred in a more incremental way than McNamara envisioned.
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In the years McNamara held the position, American governing institutions changed in several fundamental ways that would affect how US policy towards international organizations would be made. First of all, the congressional committee structure became less influential.
Second, interest group activity grew around single issues and not around packages of issues negotiated by political parties. 49 Jeffrey Berry has argued that the changes in interest group operation raised the likelihood of conflict because competing coalitions were so much more complex, and so many more groups needed to be satisfied to reach a consensus. 50 The creation of IDA in the 1950s to make long-term concessional loans meant that the Bank was now reliant on an annual appropriation from Congress to supply it. Since the Bank's Articles of Agreement stipulated that only a government's finance ministry could serve as an intermediary, the US Treasury could speed or slow down Congress's action for money on IDA. Interest groups could further influence activities on Capitol Hill. The creation of IDA and evolution of the congressional role made the Bank increasingly subservient to broader US foreign policy issues.
McNamara did not want the Bank to be perceived as an American institution. Fowler detailed congressional objections to the organization, which ranged from its cost as a percentage of its returns, the lack of congressional control over the use of the funds, its role as a so-called "handout" of foreign currency, its contribution to the foreign aid budget, and its role in the growing balance of payments problems in the US because procurement from US suppliers was not guaranteed. 53 Therefore, while problems with the IDA appropriation persisted throughout his presidency, they did not commence with McNamara's arrival.
McNamara Works within the Branches of the US Government
Despite the existing problems, the Bank would have to grow in order to lend and borrow on a larger scale. 54 In advertising the Bank as an aid agency and not as a bank, it was now susceptible to the accusation that its employees were overcompensated. At the end of the 1970s, Congress was attaching riders to bills that would prohibit lending to Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Angola, or the Central African Republic. The Bank could not accept US funds that carried restrictions. 63 McNamara cut a deal on the salaries issue and signed a letter on Vietnam. However, the Bank posed a challenge for both parties. On the Democratic side, David Obey was particularly perplexing to McNamara because he was a liberal Democrat who was nonetheless difficult with foreign aid. As was Joseph P. Kennedy Junior, a member who posed unanticipated obstacles. 64 According to McNamara's analysis of governance of the Bank and its relationship to the US government, the Bank's board played a key role insofar as it could stop something but not start it. He could work with the sensitivities of board members to achieve results that might not be immediately acceptable to the US. For example, with respect to IDA, he was successful in working with governments on the board who were friendly to IDA and then getting the US administration to go along with it. He would approach US representatives and say "more in sorrow than anger, 'We're going to go ahead without the U.S." 65 In that way, he was successful in dividing and conquering within the international organization to use the board as a source of power and authority. McNamara's sense was that the US rarely sent an effective representative.
If he had a serious question, he would take it to the Secretary of the Treasury directly. growth and the alleviation of poverty. 68 The contributions that followed came from the application of new ideas and comparative knowledge of policies in practice. As the research was conducted over time, it accumulated data so that empirical studies could interpret the experience of development across time and space. While the Bank was not noted for original ideas, it was noted for disseminating those that originated elsewhere. 69 McNamara himself had been influenced by the thinking of Barbara Ward. He first heard Ward speak to Kennedy Cabinet members at Bobby and Ethel Kennedy's home. A journalist who had covered the Marshall Plan for Europe had converted her into an admirer of the United
States and someone who believed in the potential of foreign aid. She lectured at Harvard in the early Kennedy years and moved among the members of the Eastern establishment. As a result of his forays into the topic, McNamara placed an early emphasis on population planning, which he articulated in a speech to the University of Notre Dame early in his tenure. 70 For McNamara, the World Bank was not a bank, it was a "development agency," which meant that it sought to address certain objectives in terms of social and economic advance in the developing countries that the Bank should be sensitive to. Achieving those objectives required not only action by the developing countries and their leaders, but also required external assistance. 71 The movement to transform the Bank into a development agency was controversial at the time. McNamara had relationships with consulting firms from his previous work at Ford and the Defense Department. He would rarely use a consulting firm as the CEO unless he had already decided to make a change and the firm would ratify it. He did the same with McKinsey and Company when he was at the Bank. 72 Nonetheless, unlike his predecessors, he had serious differences of opinion with presidential administrations over loans, as discussed previously with respect to Vietnam. 73 When McNamara decided to leave the Bank, he worked to secure his successor with the Carter administration and sought input from the incoming Reagan administration. He had a list of US citizens. If Carter and Reagan would not appoint someone acceptable, he also had a list of non-US citizens that he planned to circulate with the Board. Among them was James
Wolfensohn who was not a US citizen at the time. McNamara informed Wolfensohn that he was on his list for nomination as president and the two met to discuss the position. 74 McNamara was therefore willing to recommend that the Board appoint a non-US citizen if the US citizen was not competent. However he argued further that it might be a good idea to have a non-US citizen for other reasons. In the post Cold War world, the Bank would need enlightened leadership and more collective decision-making. And that is difficult for the US.
Nonetheless, he thought that the individual should be from one of the major sources of finance.
A leader from a developing country would not be appropriate because they are not a major source of finance, particularly to get IDA replenishments and capital increases. 75 
The World Bank and NGOs: James Wolfensohn
By the end of the twentieth century, both the study and practice of development had matured to the point that radical critiques emerged, at one extreme arguing that the discourse on development functioned as a mechanism for the production and management of developing countries in the postwar period. 76 In addition, the world's financial system had changed in such a way that direct access to capital markets undercut the importance of the World Bank as a source 19 of capital to many developing countries. Nonetheless, the Bank had consolidated its position for its supporters and critics alike by that time as an important site for the construction of knowledge about development, to the point where it seemed nearly impossible to come up with a different view. 77 During the same years, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) emerged within the world system as links between interdependent actors in the formal sphere of international organizations and their environments. 78 Therefore, the Bank's ninth president, James
Wolfensohn, assumed the role at a time when private capital flows surpassed official ones and the Bank appeared less relevant. Some of the strongest criticisms came from the NGO advocacy community, which pressured governments to reconsider development issues as a moral responsibility.
In addition to the new international climate for development as a field of research and operation, James Wolfensohn assumed the presidency of the World Bank in an entirely different American political climate than McNamara did. Scholars of Congress who track the polarization of the congressional parties argue that by the 1990s, the parties that had previously lacked cohesion in voting behavior grew increasingly more likely to vote with their party colleagues and against their partisan opponents. 79 Sinclair concludes that as a result, presidents lost considerably more in conditions of divided control (i.e. the president's party is different from the congressional party in control) than they gained under unified control (i.e. the president's party is the same as the congressional party in control). 80 This result would tend to inhibit policy success.
An Australian national who had a successful career in investment banking at Salomon
Brothers and later his own advisory firm, James Wolfensohn was a banker, but had many political contacts from his cultural and social activities in New York and Washington. Wolfensohn was able to call on Jordan for information when his name re-surfaced in consideration of the post. 81 Wolfensohn had met the Clintons from the first Washington dinner 20 that Jordan gave when they arrived in Washington in 1992, and he was the head of the Kennedy Center. 82 As with McNamara, James Wolfensohn continued the effort to push the World Bank beyond a narrow banking approach, toward a more comprehensive development approach that combined research on economic development with policy goals in a "knowledge bank." The results could be seen in the Economic Development Institute (EDI) and the annual publication of the World Development Reports (WDRs). 83 His development strategy was called the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) that sought to achieve development based on a comprehensive and inclusive approach with measurable long-term results, with the recipient nation in the driver's seat, and in partnership with international institutions, NGOs, and the private sector. 84 Although Wolfensohn had worked in the financial services community prior to his appointment, he regarded the Bank as somewhat different from the for-profit world. When he arrived, appointments within it followed national lines and sought to achieve an implied balance among countries and regions. This made the Bank rigid to a point, as did its compensation system. 85 Thus, as a part of this strategy, Wolfensohn tried to work more effectively with NGOs to achieve results in two main areas: one was the interrelationship of the substantive areasgovernance, corruption, finance, infrastructure and then education, health and the environment.
Since these items are interrelated, they cannot be addressed apart from each other. The second area of the CFT was the consideration of governance and legal and judicial systems and the financial systems to control. Despite the interrelationships, the development community did not work together but competed within itself. 86 One of his major initiatives was the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt forgiveness program. As someone who had spent a lifetime in banking, he felt that a lending business that served low credit borrowers would, by its nature, not receive payment of 100% on every loan. 87 The ultimate success of these programs in American politics, however, required that The Treasury must manage the administration's agenda with respect to the World Bank on the Hill, which can be helped when his party is in the majority, or hindered when it is not. In the future, whoever leads the Bank will have to operate in the political and economic context that he or she faces. Each of the areas affected by the connection between the US and the World Bank has evolved in such a way as to challenge this connection in the future. Chiefly, the Cold War has ended and access to US capital markets is no longer essential. In addition, the US is no longer the largest donor to IDA and its share of weighted votes has decreased, minimizing the initial inherent conflict between the US ED and president of the Bank in lending.
The current mission of the World Bank was thrown into question by the financial crisis of 2008.
At the time, the Bank's president, Robert Zoellick, proposed a "facebook for economic multilateralism." The new order would comprise a flexible network maximizing the strengths of interconnecting and overlapping actors and institutions, public and private. 95 Finally, as the number of constituencies for the World Bank grows, so too do the potential number of groups that must be satisfied in any national legislative coalition to win support in the future. 
